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WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN SOMEONE IS EXPECTING FOR YOU:
NEW JERSEY NEEDS TO PROTECT PARTIES TO
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
FOLLOWING IN RE T.J.S.
MELISSA RUTH*
“Today, it is not uncommon for couples unable to conceive a child to
turn to assisted-reproductive technology.  The promise of this new tech-
nology, to be sure, comes with the potential for its abuse.  The State un-
questionably is empowered to regulate this area of human affairs.”1
I. CONCEIVING NEW WAYS TO BE A PARENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
Technological advancements in reproductive technology have pro-
pelled surrogacy into the public eye as an option for those who would not
otherwise be able to have children, including same-sex couples and heter-
osexual couples facing either infertility problems or potential high risk
pregnancies.2  Surrogacy gives these couples the option to have children
to whom they have a genetic connection.3  While surrogacy is a growing
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 2012,
Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank all of my family and friends
who always help and support me.  I am especially grateful to those who provided
feedback and input in writing this Note, particularly my sister Kimberly.  I would
also like to thank the Villanova Law Review and everyone whose work went into the
publication of this Note.
1. In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 269–70 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) (discussing surrogacy agreements).
2. See Caitlin Conklin, Note, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United
States and the Pressing Need for Regulation, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 67, 67 (2013)
(explaining surrogacy has become mainstream due to celebrities using surrogates,
as well as television shows and books representing surrogacy in pop culture).
Doctors at fertility clinics treat “plumbers, schoolteachers and lawyers” as
well as patients whose desire for children has been hampered by psycho-
logical problems, life-threatening diseases, or crippling accidents.
Among the fastest growing clientele are single mothers, lesbians, and
gays—driven less by infertility than by the absence of a willing or viable
reproductive partner.
J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 345,
351 (2011) (footnote omitted).
3. See Fred Silberberg, Is Surrogacy on Its Way to Becoming ‘The New Normal’?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
fred-silberberg/surrogacy_b_1610804.html (“Surrogacy affords the opportunity of
a dream-come-true for couples and individuals hoping to become parents but face
the burdens of infertility or other health issues which make pregnancy and delivery
dangerous or impossible.  It enables you to welcome a child into the world who is
truly your own and continue the miracle of your family lines.”).
(383)
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practice, it remains highly unregulated, or at least very inconsistently
regulated.4
Surrogacy is frequently featured in headlines for both positive and
negative experiences.5  News stories often share many joyful experiences
with surrogacy, including many notable celebrities who have taken part in
the growing fertility option.6  Unfortunately, some people face difficulties
with surrogacy agreements where regulations are lacking or nonexistent.7
Despite some negative attention, when properly regulated, surrogacy
can be a great opportunity to start families for those who cannot conceive
4. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 68–69 (discussing various state laws on surro-
gacy throughout the country).  Conklin asserts that surrogacy laws vary greatly
from state to state within the United States. See id. (discussing laws from state to
state).  She finds three categories of regulation: states that have no statute regard-
ing surrogacy agreements, have a complete ban on surrogacy agreements, or have
a statute limiting enforcement of the agreements to gestational carrier agree-
ments. See id. (finding three categories of laws states use to deal with surrogacy).
5. See, e.g., Kirthana Ramisetti, Sherri Shepherd’s Surrogate Gives Birth to Baby Boy:
Report, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
entertainment/gossip/sherri-shepherd-surrogate-birth-report-article-1.1892957
(explaining divorce dispute regarding surrogacy arrangement).  Sherri Shepherd
recently gained media attention due to her messy divorce and a dispute with her
husband regarding the surrogacy agreement that the couple entered into during
their marriage. See id.  Despite reports that Shepherd did not want to be listed as
the child’s mother, and did not seek custody over the child, her ex-husband never-
theless sought child support from her for the child. See id.
6. See, e.g., Leigh Blickley, Celebrities Who’ve Used Surrogates to Conceive
(PHOTOS), HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/02/06/celebrities-who-have-used-surrogates_n_2624998.html (listing
celebrities who have used surrogates to have children and report great experiences
with surrogacy process, including Giuliana Rancic, Elton John, and Sarah Jessica
Parker).  Additionally, surrogacy has been featured in popular culture, such as in
the television show The New Normal, which has also helped make surrogacy seem
more commonplace. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 67 (discussing ways surrogacy
has become more mainstream).
7. See Jocelyn Gecker, News Guide: Thailand’s Surrogacy Scandals and Laws, ASSO-
CIATED PRESS (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:06 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/news-guide-
thailands-surrogacy-scandals-and-laws (explaining recent scandals regarding Thai-
land’s loose surrogacy laws and their effects).  News stories recently arose out of
Thailand regarding the country’s lack of regulation and its reputation as a hub for
international surrogacy. See id. (discussing country’s lack of regulation).
First, in July, Thai media publicized that a couple from Australia abandoned
one of their twins born from a surrogate in Thailand because the baby, “Baby
Gammy,” had Down syndrome, but the couple nonetheless took the healthy twin
home. See id. (discussing couple’s choice to use surrogate in Thailand due to Aus-
tralia’s prohibition on surrogacy).  Most recently, reports of a twenty-four-year-old
Japanese man fathering up to sixteen babies through surrogacy caused interna-
tional outrage. See id. (stating Japanese man used Thai surrogate to father sixteen
babies).  Thai authorities did not know why the man had entered into so many
surrogacy agreements and were investigating the matter. See id. (stating that moti-
vation for man entering surrogacy agreements was unknown).  Due to the numer-
ous problems, Thailand put a temporary ban on surrogacy, and surrogate children
were thus unable to leave the country with their intended parents. See id. (discuss-
ing actions taken to prevent more problems in future).
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on their own.8  Intended parents frequently bond and become close with
their gestational carriers.9  Estimates suggest that over 22,000 children
have been born through surrogates so far in America, many of which for-
tunately occur without dispute.10
There are two different types of surrogacy agreements: traditional
and gestational.11  In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate is artificially in-
seminated using her own egg and the intended father’s sperm (or in some
situations, a donor sperm).12  In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is im-
pregnated through in vitro fertilization, so she has no genetic connection
to the child.13  Therefore, in a typical gestational surrogacy situation,
there can be as many as five different people with potential parental rights
8. See Difonzo & Stern, supra note 2, at 348 (discussing how use of reproduc-
tive technologies has changed how families are started).
9. See id. at 359 (discussing bond between intended parents and gestational
carriers).  Difonzo and Stern explain that “[w]hen treated with ‘respect, honor
and care,’ surrogates find that it is their bond with the intended parents, not with
the baby, that is of the utmost value.” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Karen Busby
& Delaney Vun, Revisiting the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Re-
search on Surrogate Motherhood 32 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/329.pdf) (describing relationship between in-
tended parents and surrogates).  They also point out that surrogate mothers typi-
cally want to have good relationships with the intended parents to make the
experience more rewarding and to have what she is doing for the couple “‘cele-
brated and acknowledged.’” See id. at 358 (quoting LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CON-
CEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE
WORLD 136 (2007)) (discussing intended parents’ relationships with their surro-
gate mothers).
10. See Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Prolifer-
ate, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/as_surrogacy_becomes_more_popular_legal_problems_proliferate/ (stating
not many reliable statistics exist on surrogacy due to lack of studies or tracking, but
at least one statistic suggests as many as 22,000 children have been born using
surrogacy); see also Difonzo & Stern, supra note 2, at 356 (“Although surrogates
admit that separating from the baby ‘is still the hardest part of the job,’ they rarely
refuse to relinquish a child after giving birth.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Lor-
raine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7, 2008))).
11. See Leora I. Gabry, Note, Procreating Without Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the
Need for a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 415, 418–19
(2012) (“In a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate’s egg is fertilized
using artificial insemination, resulting in a genetic relationship between the carrier
and the child. . . .  Gestational surrogacy, which involves implanting the surrogate
with an embryo via in vitro fertilization (IVF), eliminates the biological relation-
ship between the surrogate and the child.”).
12. See id. at 419 (stating father has genetic connection to child when his
sperm is used instead of donor’s sperm).  Artificial insemination is one of the old-
est forms of assisted reproduction technology. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making
for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113
HARV. L. REV. 835, 845 (2000) (describing artificial insemination).
13. See Gabry, supra note 11, at 419 (finding gestational surrogacy more com-
monly used today).  For in vitro fertilization, fertilization of the egg occurs outside
of the body, and the embryo is subsequently implanted in the uterus. See Garrison,
supra note 12, at 848–49.  Thus, the carrier does not necessarily have a genetic
connection to the child. See id. (explaining how in vitro fertilization works).
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to a child: the intended parents (the person or couple who plans to keep
and raise the child), people with a genetic relation to the child (a sperm
donor and/or an egg donor), and the surrogate mother who carries the
child to term.14
When problems arise regarding surrogacy agreements, state legisla-
tures and a non-existent regulatory framework are usually to blame.15
With potentially five different people involved in bringing a child into the
world, courts have struggled to determine who should be the legal parents
of these children.16  Some laws, like New Jersey’s, remain unchanged by
advancing technology and only allow the woman who gives birth to a child
to be the child’s legal mother.17
In In re T.J.S.,18 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a divided decision,
failed to give any clear guidance on the matter.19  In T.J.S., the court rein-
forced New Jersey’s law, finding compensated surrogacy agreements unen-
14. See Craig Dashiell, Note, From Louise Brown to Baby M and Beyond: A Proposed
Framework for Understanding Surrogacy, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 851, 855 (2013) (listing
all individuals who can be considered in determining parental rights as part of
gestational surrogacy agreement).  Intended parents, genetic parents, and the
birth mother can all potentially assert parental rights to the child. See id. (discuss-
ing confusion over who to name as legal parents).
15. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 266 (N.J. 2012) (Hoens, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that Legislature, instead of courts, should address surrogacy issues).  As a
general matter, gestational surrogacy remains highly unregulated. See Dashiell,
supra note 14, at 859–60.  No federal statute or case law exists to provide guidance,
and the state laws vary significantly. See id. (asserting that issue of surrogacy is ripe
for Supreme Court’s review).
16. See, e.g., T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (interpreting New
Jersey Parentage Act); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988) (decid-
ing whether birth mother or intended mother has parental rights); A.G.R. v.
D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *1–3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (involving two male intended parents, one of
which was also genetic parent, and birth mother); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948,
954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (involving intended parents who were also
genetic parents in surrogacy arrangement).
17. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a)–(b) (West 2013) (defining mother and
child relationship based only on who gave birth to child).  The statute specifies:
“[t]he parent and child relationship between a child and [ ] [t]he natural mother,
may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under P.L.
1983 . . . .” See id. § 9:17-41(a).  The act proceeds to list the numerous ways that
legal fatherhood can be determined, after listing only the birth mother as being
proper to establish a mother and child relationship. See id. § 9:17-41(a)–(b) (pro-
viding multiple ways that men can be deemed legal fathers but only one way for
women to be recognized as legal mothers).
18. 54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam).
19. See id. at 263 (affirming Appellate Division’s ruling due to equally divided
court).  The Appellate Division found no violation of the New Jersey Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause in the differences between the presumptions of paternity
and maternity. See In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 393 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(dismissing equal protection claims).  “Where, however, only one of the spouses is
infertile, an equal protection claim has not been articulated because their respec-
tive situations are not parallel and the Legislature is entitled to take these situa-
tional differences into account in defining additional means of creating
parenthood.” Id. at 398.  The Appellate Division also found that, under the Par-
4
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forceable.20  The court also dismissed claims of gender discrimination,
allowing a presumption of parentage for infertile men but not for infertile
women.21  Further, Governor Chris Christie vetoed a bill that would have
allowed and regulated gestational surrogacy agreements, a few months
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in T.J.S.22
This Note disagrees with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s dismissal of
gestational surrogacy agreements under the New Jersey Parentage Act,
and it argues that legislation must be passed to enforce and regulate gesta-
tional carrier agreements and to alleviate the state’s public policy con-
cerns.23  Part II provides an overview of surrogacy law in New Jersey
entage Act, only the biological mother of the child can be deemed the legal
mother. See id. at 391 (finding surrogacy agreement contrary to Parentage Act).
The Appellate Division also interpreted the silence of the Legislature follow-
ing Baby M as an indication that the holdings of Baby M still applied. See id. at
395–96 (relying on Baby M court’s reasoning).  “Nothing in our Constitution or
law provides that an adult—male or female—with no biological or gestational con-
nection to a child has a fundamental right to create parentage by the most expedi-
tious or convenient method possible.” Id. at 398.  Some commenters express
contrary opinions. See, e.g., Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the
United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 110 (2010) (“A Fourteenth Amendment argu-
ment can also be made on Equal Protection grounds.  State laws do not usually ban
artificial insemination when the man is sterile; thus, banning surrogacy, the rem-
edy when the woman is sterile or otherwise unable to gestate a child, discriminates
based on sex.”).
20. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 268 (Hoens, J., concurring) (finding compensated
gestational surrogacy agreements against statutory provisions and public policy).
While surrogacy has never been expressly prohibited in New Jersey, courts consist-
ently refuse to enforce these agreements. See, e.g., id. at 268–69 (failing to enforce
surrogacy agreement); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 (refusing to enforce surrogacy
agreement); A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *4 (refusing to en-
force surrogacy agreement); A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954 (refusing to enforce surro-
gacy agreement).
21. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 268–69 (Hoens, J., concurring) (dismissing gender
discrimination claims, even though court was evenly split on issue).
22. See Chris Christie, Governor’s Veto Message to S. Bill No. 1599 (Aug. 9, 2012),
available at https://votesmart.org/static/vetotext/41597.pdf (declining to approve
legislation regulating gestational carrier agreements).  Governor Christie currently
holds the record as the New Jersey Governor who has vetoed the most legislation.
See Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Breaks Record for Most Bills Vetoed in N.J., STAR
LEDGER (Jan., 21, 2014, 10:26 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/
01/christie_signs_some_bills_vetos_others.html (stating that Governor Christie
holds record for vetoing most legislation since 1988).  As of January 2014, Gover-
nor Christie had vetoed over 164 bills in a two-year time period—a record un-
matched by any other governor since 1988. See id. (discussing bills Governor
Christie has vetoed).  Altogether, Governor Christie has now used his veto power
314 times. See Reid Wilson, Chris Christie’s Veto Strategy, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/09/chris-christies-
veto-strategy/ (discussing politics of New Jersey Governor’s veto power).  The Gov-
ernor of New Jersey receives considerable power from the state’s constitution, in-
cluding the veto power, more so than in most other states. See id. (explaining New
Jersey executive power).
23. See T.J.S., 16 A.3d at 397–98 (failing to enforce gestational surrogacy
agreement); see also S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (regulating gestational surro-
5
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leading up to the case of T.J.S.24  Next, Part III sets out the facts and hold-
ings of T.J.S.25  Part IV then analyzes the court’s reasoning.26  Part V con-
cludes by asserting that legislation is needed in New Jersey to protect the
rights of all parties involved in gestational surrogacy agreements.27
II. PREPARING FOR THE NEW ARRIVAL: THE LAW LEADING UP TO T.J.S.
The law regarding the enforcement of surrogacy agreements in New
Jersey prior to T.J.S. was ambiguous.28  While no state law prohibits surro-
gacy, New Jersey courts have rarely enforced surrogacy agreements and
have consistently refused to enforce compensated surrogacy agreements.29
While many hoped the Legislature’s consideration of the issue in 2012
would provide a solution, Governor Christie vetoed the bill, stopping pro-
gress in its tracks.30
A. Baby-proofing the State: Surrogacy Cases in New Jersey
First surfacing in the 1970s, surrogacy contracts prolifer-
ated, provoking questions regarding their legality.31  In In re Baby
gacy agreements through Gestational Carrier Agreement Act); Christie, supra note
22 (vetoing Gestational Carrier Agreement Act).
24. For a further discussion of surrogacy law in New Jersey, see infra notes
28–95 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holdings in
T.J.S., see infra notes 96–153 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of the necessity of surrogacy legislation in New
Jersey, see infra notes 154–93 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of how T.J.S. will affect potential parents in New
Jersey, see infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
28. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating compen-
sated surrogacy agreements and traditional surrogacy agreements); see also A.G.R.
v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *4 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (refusing to enforce surrogacy agreement);
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (refusing to
enforce surrogacy agreement but allowing intended parents, who were both also
genetic parents, to put names on birth certificate following 72-hour wait period).
29. See, e.g., Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 (refusing to enforce surrogacy agree-
ment); A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *8 (same); A.H.W., 772
A.2d at 954 (same).
30. See S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (allowing enforcement of gestational
surrogacy agreements following required guidelines). But see Christie, supra note
22 (vetoing Gestational Carrier Agreement Act).
31. See Spivack, supra note 19, at 98 (stating traditional surrogacy first became
available in 1978 due to technological advances).  One of the first surrogacy con-
tracts occurred in California in 1978, after a couple put an ad in a newspaper
looking for a surrogate who would be impregnated via artificial insemination. See
id. (providing historical background to surrogacy agreements).  A Michigan
couple then approached attorney Noel Keane to see if the couple could use a
similar agreement in Michigan. See id. (discussing early occurrences of surrogacy
agreements).  Keane wrote to a judge to learn the legalities of the proposal, and
the judge wrote back explaining that the agreement would be enforceable as long
as the surrogate was not paid for her services. See id. (seeking legal advice on
enforceability of surrogacy agreement).
6
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M,32 the Supreme Court of New Jersey famously became the first court to
consider the validity of surrogacy agreements.33  The Baby M case featured
plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Stern, who entered into a traditional surrogacy
agreement with Mrs. Mary Beth Whitehead, their surrogate.34  Mrs. White-
head became pregnant through in vitro fertilization using Mr. Stern’s
sperm and Mrs. Whitehead’s own egg.35
The surrogacy agreement between the plaintiffs and the surrogate
stated that Mrs. Whitehead would terminate her maternal rights after the
child was born.36  Additionally, the agreement stipulated that Mr. Stern
would pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 after the child was born and in his
custody.37  The agreement also provided that Mr. Whitehead would rebut
the presumption of paternity as her husband.38  While Mrs. Stern was not
a party to the contract, the contract gave her custody of the child should
anything have happened to Mr. Stern.39
Once Baby Melissa (Baby M) was born in 1986, Mrs. Whitehead
changed her mind about giving up her parental rights and wanted to keep
32. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
33. See id. at 1234–35 (finding surrogacy contracts violate statutory law and
public policy).  The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the issue for the first
time when surrogacy first became more prominent in the 1980s. See id. at 1264
(becoming first court to address surrogacy contracts).
34. See id. at 1235 (noting Ms. Stern’s decision to pursue surrogacy upon
learning of potential health risks she could face in pregnancy due to her multiple
sclerosis diagnosis).  The Sterns had considered other options to start a family,
including adoption, but the couple determined surrogacy would be the best
choice for them. See id. at 1236 (deciding to use surrogacy to have child).  Addi-
tionally, having children was very important to Mr. Stern, who had lost much of his
family in the Holocaust and wanted to further his family line. See id. at 1235 (dis-
cussing reasoning behind surrogacy choice).
35. See id. at 1235–36 (discussing use of traditional surrogacy).  Traditional
surrogacy gives the surrogate mother a genetic connection to the child, which fre-
quently causes more legal problems if disputes arise. See id. (explaining surrogate’s
genetic relationship to child).  The genetic connection to the child gives more
weight to the surrogate’s argument for parental rights. See id. (discussing genetic
relationship).
36. See id. at 1235 (discussing necessity of terminating surrogate’s maternal
rights so Mrs. Stern could proceed as child’s legal mother).
37. See id. (describing terms of contract).  In another contract, Mr. Stern also
agreed to pay the fertility clinic that arranged the agreement $7,500. See id. (dis-
cussing fees paid by Stern family regarding surrogacy agreement).
38. See id. (discussing surrogate’s husband as additional party to contract).
Under New Jersey law, Mr. Whitehead could have attempted to assert paternal
rights over the child because his wife gave birth to the child. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-43(a)(1) (West 2013) (presuming husband as father of children to which
his wife gives birth).  Therefore, Mr. Whitehead declining to assert parental rights
was important to this particular surrogacy agreement. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235
(explaining that Mr. Whitehead promised to take action to rebut presumption of
paternity).
39. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 (commenting that Mrs. Stern’s absence from
surrogacy contract may have been to avoid New Jersey’s baby-selling statute that
was relevant at that time).
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Baby M.40  The plaintiffs responded by filing a complaint seeking to re-
store custody of Baby M, at which point Mrs. Whitehead fled the state with
the child.41  The trial court found the surrogacy agreement between the
parties valid and ordered the termination of Mrs. Whitehead’s parental
rights over Baby M.42  Mrs. Whitehead appealed the trial court’s decision,
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey subsequently granted direct certifi-
cation.43  On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately overturned
the trial court’s decision, holding that the surrogacy agreement was invalid
because it conflicted with state statutes and public policy.44
Moreover, in the 2000 case A.H.W. v. G.H.B.,45 the Superior Court of
New Jersey (Chancery Division) declined to enforce a surrogacy agree-
ment, even though both intended parents were genetically related to
child.46  Andrea and Peter, unable to conceive a child on their own, en-
40. See id. at 1236 (noting Mrs. Whitehead’s realization that she did not want
to part with child).  Mrs. Whitehead initially remained true to the agreement and
gave the child to the Sterns. See id. (honoring agreement at birth of child).  The
next day, Mrs. Whitehead expressed extreme despair over not having the child, so
the Sterns agreed to let Mrs. Whitehead take the baby for a week, out of fear that
Mrs. Whitehead might commit suicide. See id. at 1237 (describing Sterns’ fear re-
garding Mrs. Whitehead’s mental state).  Mrs. Whitehead then refused to give the
baby back, and the Sterns had the baby forcibly removed from Mrs. Whitehead. See
id. at 1236 (stating baby had to be forcibly taken from Mrs. Whitehead).
41. See id. at 1237 (stating Mrs. Whitehead fled to Florida with child).
After the order [seeking enforcement of the surrogacy agreement] was
entered, ex parte, the process server, aided by the police, in the presence
of the Sterns, entered Mrs. Whitehead’s home to execute the order.  Mr.
Whitehead fled with the child, who had been handed to him through a
window while those who came to enforce the order were thrown off bal-
ance by a dispute over the child’s current name.
Id.
42. See id. at 1237–38 (describing trial court’s determination that surrogacy
contract was valid, thus allowing Mrs. Stern to adopt baby).  The trial took over
thirty-two days and included twenty-three witnesses, most of whom testified regard-
ing what custody outcome would be in the child’s best interest—a question heavily
focused on in the trial court’s opinion. See id. (noting that allowing Sterns to be
child’s parents would be in that child’s best interest).
43. See id. at 1238 (granting certification following appeal).  The court
granted continuation of visitation rights for Mrs. Whitehead during the appeal,
contrary to the opinion of the lower court. See id.
44. See id. at 1240 (finding surrogacy agreement in conflict with public policy
and statutory provision).  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that surrogacy
agreements violated the New Jersey Parentage Act by requiring the birth mother to
give up her parental rights. See id. at 1240, 1242 (finding violation of Parentage
Act).  Under the act, a mother was only defined as the “birth mother,” and the act
does not allow someone to be compelled to terminate his or her parental rights.
See id. at 1242 (defining legal mother only as birth mother).  The court also held
that the agreement conflicted with New Jersey public policy due to the potential
for the degradation of women volunteering to be surrogate mothers and the sepa-
ration of a child from its natural parent. See id. at 1246–50 (finding surrogacy
agreements contrary to public policy).
45. 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
46. See id. at 949 (invalidating gestational surrogacy agreement despite in-
tended parents’ genetic relation to baby).
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tered into an uncompensated gestational surrogacy contract with Andrea’s
sister, Gina.47  An embryo created from Andrea’s egg and Peter’s sperm
was implanted in Gina.48  The couple filed a complaint seeking a pre-birth
order allowing them to be listed as the child’s parents on the child’s birth
certificate.49
The Superior Court of New Jersey denied the pre-birth order.50  In-
stead, the court issued a separate order, allowing the couple to be listed as
parents on the birth certificate, following a mandated 72-hour wait period
after the child’s birth, so long as the certificate was filed before expiration
of the required five-day deadline to file birth certificates.51  In its decision,
the court urged the Legislature to clarify the issues surrounding gesta-
tional surrogacy.52  Nevertheless, without such guidance, the court was
bound by precedent, set by Baby M and the applicable statutes, which re-
quired a 72-hour wait period before a birth mother could relinquish her
parental rights.53
In 2009, the New Jersey Superior Court (Chancery Division) decided
A.G.R v. D.R.H.,54 a case featuring a same-sex male couple, D.R. and S.H.,
who entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with D.R.’s sister,
A.G.R.55  The couple used S.H.’s sperm and a donor egg.56  A.G.R. gave
birth to twins in October 2006, and shortly after, A.G.R. sought parental
rights over the children.57  The couple argued that the case was distin-
guishable from Baby M because A.G.R. had no genetic connection to the
47. See id. at 949–50 (stating wife could not carry pregnancy to term, so Gina
volunteered to serve as her sister’s surrogate).
48. See id. (making both Andrea and Peter genetic parents of child).
49. See id. at 950 (arguing pre-birth orders could be entered in gestational
surrogacy agreements as opposed to traditional surrogacy agreements, where such
orders had been prohibited).
50. See id. at 949 (denying pre-birth order).
51. See id. (modifying original agreement to allow intended parents to be
listed as legal parents after seventy-two hour wait period and before five-day period
to file birth certificate elapsed).
52. See id. at 954 (supporting ability of Legislature to provide clarity on issues
surrounding surrogacy).
53. See id. at 953–54 (finding surrogate still has connection to baby, even if
not biologically, and as such, she cannot be forced to give up her rights to child
prior to that child’s birth).
54. No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
55. See id. at *1–2 (discussing defendants’ decision to start family and their
desire to have genetic link to child).
56. See id. at *2.
57. See id. at *2–3 (asserting parental rights over twin girls).  During the preg-
nancy, the relationship between the couple and A.G.R. began to fall apart. See
Joanna L. Grossman, The Complications of Surrogacy: A New Jersey Court Refuses to Up-
hold a Surrogacy Arrangement, but Awards Full Custody to the Intended Father, VERDICT
(Jan. 10, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/01/10/the-complications-of-surro-
gacy (describing relationship between couple and A.G.R.).  A.G.R. and her brother
worked together and had a rocky work relationship. See id. (discussing deteriorat-
ing relationship between A.G.R. and her brother).  During the pregnancy, A.G.R.
9
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child, but the court disagreed stating: “the genetic makeup of the infant as
it relates to the birth mother was only mentioned once in Baby M.”58
The A.G.R. court pointed to the same public policy considerations
referred to in Baby M as being relevant to the case at hand.59  Once again
noting the Legislature’s silence on the enforceability of surrogacy agree-
ments, the court was limited to the definitions of “mother” and “father”
provided in the New Jersey Parentage Act.60  The A.G.R. decision also re-
flected the court’s reluctance to terminate parental rights of the birth
mother.61  Ultimately, the court upheld the parental rights of A.G.R. and
found the gestational agreement void.62  The court, however, recognized
S.H. as the legal father due to his genetic connection to the child.63  While
A.G.R. initially gained parental rights after being deemed the children’s
legal mother, S.H. subsequently won sole custody in 2011, when the court
considered the children’s best interests.64  Nonetheless, D.R. was still left
with no legal parental rights to the child he intended to raise with his
husband.65
“became depressed,” disappeared, “and lived in her car for three days . . . .” See id.
(discussing issues that arose during pregnancy).
58. See A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *4–5, 7 (finding Baby
M holding not limited to situations of traditional surrogacy).  The court also com-
pared New Jersey surrogacy laws to those of California. See id. at *11.  The court
stated that California law takes the position that it is “disrespectful toward women
to not allow them to enter into agreements of this nature, whereas New Jersey law
takes a clearly different position that agreements of this nature have a ‘potential
for devastation’ to women.” See id. (citation omitted) (quoting In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988)).
59. See id. at *9 (noting public policy concerns recognized in Baby M also ap-
ply to this case).  The court suggested the Baby M decision still controlled the situa-
tion, even though the surrogate had no genetic connection to the child. See id. at
*10 (relying on Baby M precedent).
60. See id. at *8 (finding Legislature’s silence following Baby M decision sug-
gested deliberate choice not to recognize surrogacy).
61. See id. at *11–12 (discussing why surrogacy contracts “ ‘are directly con-
trary to the objectives of our laws’” (quoting Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250)).
62. See id. at *12–13 (finding consent to judgment of adoption void).
63. See id. at *13 (referencing New Jersey Parentage Act).  The court declined
to find both defendants as legal parents of the children, and it only made the
determination in regards to S.H., who was the genetic father of the children. See
id.
64. See Grossman, supra note 57 (explaining subsequent custody hearing).  At
this subsequent hearing, the court considered what was in the children’s best inter-
est. See id.  Following the initial court decision, A.G.R. returned to the Baptist faith
and adopted negative views of homosexuality, which she shared with the twins
while in their presence. See id. (discussing factors considered in custody decision).
Considering A.G.R.’s views, among many other factors, the judge found S.H. more
suited to deal with the unique needs of the twins. See id. (deciding custody dispute
in favor of S.H.).
65. See A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *12–13 (recognizing
S.H. and A.G.R. as legal parents).
10
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B. Governor Christie Refuses to Pacify Surrogacy Concerns by Vetoing
Gestational Surrogacy Legislation
Hearing the outcry for guidance from the courts, in 2012, the New
Jersey Legislature proposed a bill to regulate gestational surrogacy.66  The
State Senate introduced the Gestational Carrier Agreement Act in Febru-
ary 2012, and passed the bill as amended on May 31, 2012.67  Less than
one month later, the bill passed the Assembly on June 21, 2012.68  The
Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, however, came to a standstill on Au-
gust 9, 2012, when Governor Chris Christie vetoed the bill.69
The Gestational Carrier Act would have validated gestational surro-
gacy agreements and imposed regulations clarifying standards for enforce-
ability.70  Under the act, gestational surrogacy agreements meeting the
specific codified conditions would be presumed enforceable in New Jersey
courts.71  First, the bill regulated which individuals could serve as a surro-
gate, specifying that the individual must be at least 21-years-old; have given
birth to at least one other child; retained an attorney; and undergone a
psychological and medical evaluation.72  Moreover, the intended parents
would be required to undergo psychological evaluations and to retain in-
dependent counsel.73  The proposed act also required the agreement be-
tween the intended parents and the surrogate to be in writing.74
Notably, if an intended parent was married, in a civil union, or in a
domestic partnership, the proposed act required both partners to enter
66. See S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (validating compensated gestational
surrogacy agreements with regulations).
67. See id.; see also Vitale-Weinberg-Buono Legislation to Permit Gestational Carrier
Agreements Clears Senate, POLITICKERNJ (May 31, 2012, 5:49 PM), http://politick-
ernj.com/2012/05/vitale-weinberg-buono-legislation-to-permit-gestational-carrier-
agreements-clears-senate/ (noting bill’s passage in New Jersey Senate).
68. See N.J. S. 1599 (passing in New Jersey Assembly in June 2012).
69. See Christie, supra note 22 (explaining Governor’s veto of Gestational Sur-
rogacy Act).
70. See N.J. S. 1599 (providing regulations for gestational surrogacy
agreements).
71. See id. at 2 (declaring gestational surrogacy agreements to be in accor-
dance with New Jersey public policy).
72. See id. at 4–5 (providing requirements as to who could serve as surrogate
under legally enforceable agreements).  The law would create a twenty-one-year-
old age requirement, as well as medical and psychological requirements. See id.
(listing requirements to qualify as surrogate).
73. See id. at 3, 5 (stating medical and psychological screenings must occur
prior to any medical procedures to begin embryo implantation in surrogate).  A
requisite psychological evaluation is defined as “an evaluation and consultation by
a clinical social worker, psychotherapist, or psychiatrist licensed by the State of
New Jersey or licensed to practice in any one of the United States . . . .” Id. at 3.
74. See id. at 5 (specifying that agreements must be in writing to be
enforceable).
11
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into the surrogacy agreement.75  Further, the bill recognized that neither
the surrogate mother nor the spouse of a surrogate would be considered a
legal parent of the child.76  The intended parents would become the
child’s legal parents “immediately upon the birth of the child . . . .”77  The
proposed act also validated compensated surrogacy agreements, provided
the compensation was limited to “reasonable expenses in connection with
the agreement . . . .”78
Ultimately, Governor Christie did not think New Jersey was ready to
be one of the first states regulating gestational surrogacy.79  Referring to
surrogacy agreements as “contracts for the birth of children” and “ar-
ranged births,” Governor Christie vetoed the Gestational Carrier Act,
claiming the questions and issues raised by gestational surrogacy agree-
ments had not been studied enough by the Legislature to justify passing
such a law.80
75. See id. (stating any intended parent’s spouse must be included in surro-
gacy agreement and stipulate that both partners would become legal parents at
birth).
76. See id. at 6 (“[I]f the gestational carrier is married or in a civil union or
domestic partnership, the spouse or partner agrees to the obligations imposed on
the gestational carrier pursuant to the terms of the gestational carrier agreement
and to surrender custody of the child to the intended parent immediately upon
the child’s birth . . . .”).
77. See id. at 4 (stating intended parents become legal parents upon the birth
of child).
78. See id. at 6 (allowing only reasonable expenses as permissible compensa-
tion to gestational surrogate).  The act defined “[r]easonable expenses” as:
[M]edical, hospital, counseling or other similar expenses incurred in
connection with the gestational carrier agreement, reasonable attorney
fees and costs for legal services in connection with the gestational carrier
agreement, and the reasonable living expenses of the gestational carrier
during her pregnancy including payments for reasonable food, clothing,
medical expenses, shelter, and religious, psychological, vocational, or
similar counseling services during the period of the pregnancy and dur-
ing the period of postpartum recovery.
Id. at 4.  Additionally, the act clarified that these payments could be made directly
to the surrogate or to a third party supplying goods or services in relation to the
surrogacy agreement. See id. (specifying how payments could be made).
79. See Christie, supra note 22, at 2 (finding bill “would now make New Jersey
one of the few states in the nation that expressly authorize gestational carrier
agreements”).
80. See id. (claiming more in depth study on gestational surrogacy is needed).
Governor Christie noted that “[p]ermitting adults to contract with others regard-
ing a child in such a manner unquestionably raises serious and significant issues.”
Id. Governor Christie will most likely get another chance to review the legislation
in the upcoming year, however, because the New Jersey legislature has proposed
the Gestational Carrier Act again. See Susan K. Livio, N.J. Senate Approves Bill Ex-
panding Definition of Surrogate Parenting, STAR-LEDGER (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:22 PM),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/02/nj_senate_approves_bill_expand
ing_definition_of_su.html (discussing proposal of previously-vetoed bill).  In Feb-
ruary 2015, the bill passed in the New Jersey Senate, and the bill was sent to the
Assembly for further review. See id. (noting Assembly must vote on bill).
12
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C. Taking a Peek into Surrogacy Laws in Other States
The advances in infertility technology over the past two decades, in
particular regarding gestational surrogacy, have resulted in patchwork ap-
proaches to surrogacy agreements by the states.81  Due to the complica-
tions that arise when the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother of
the child, as seen in Baby M, traditional surrogacy has been deemed unac-
ceptable in most states.82  On the other hand, laws regarding gestational
surrogacy, where the surrogate mother has no genetic connection to the
child, vary from state to state.83  Some jurisdictions, including Arizona and
the District of Columbia, completely ban surrogacy agreements.84  Alter-
natively, other states have no relevant statutes, or only ambiguous case law
regarding the validity of surrogacy agreements.85  Further, other states put
only partial bans on surrogacy.86
California’s history with surrogacy agreements is much more progres-
sive than New Jersey’s, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia’s decision in the 1993 case Johnson v. Calvert.87  In Johnson, the
Supreme Court of California upheld a gestational surrogacy agreement
and held that the intended mother was the legal mother of the child born
as a result of a surrogacy agreement.88  The surrogate and the intended
81. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 74–87 (discussing differences in surrogacy
laws by state).
82. See id. at 74–79 (noting that traditional surrogacy agreements are unen-
forceable in New Jersey and New York).
83. See Guide to State Surrogacy Laws, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2007/12/17/3758/
guide-to-state-surrogacy-laws/ (noting which states ban surrogacy, threaten voids
and penalties, threaten voids only, enforce some prohibitions of surrogacy, and
allow surrogacy generally, but regulate it).
84. See id. (noting that currently, Arizona and District of Columbia ban all
surrogacy agreements).  Nevertheless, Washington, D.C. currently has legislation
pending that would allow and regulate gestational surrogacy. See Council B20-
0032, 2013 Leg. (D.C. 2013) (validating surrogacy contracts and providing gui-
dance on how to enforce agreements).
85. See Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother?  Defending the Rights of In-
tended Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GEN-
DER SOC. POL’Y & L. 131, 141–42 (2006) (stating no Pennsylvania statues exist
regarding surrogacy).  Pennsylvania has a policy for gestational surrogacy enacted
by the Department of Health, which allows intended parents to be considered the
legal parents of the child on the birth certificate. See id. (explaining surrogacy
options in Pennsylvania).  This policy “is not binding on the courts,” but at least
fifteen counties have recognized the intended parents on birth certificates. See id.
at 142 & n.68 (discussing Pennsylvania recognition of surrogacy).
86. See Guide to State Surrogacy Laws, supra note 83 (explaining that some states
prohibit certain types of agreements while allowing others).  North Dakota “recog-
nizes gestational carrier agreements,” while voiding traditional surrogacy agree-
ments. See id. (discussing North Dakota law).  The state of Washington allows for
surrogacy, but only allows for surrogate compensation of reasonable expenses and
nothing beyond that. See id. (explaining Washington surrogacy law).
87. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (in bank).
88. See id. at 782 (upholding validity of gestational surrogacy agreement).
13
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mother both presented acceptable claims as the child’s mother because
the surrogate gave birth to the child, and the intended mother was the
child’s genetic mother.89  The court analyzed the surrogacy agreement
based on the parties’ intentions and found the intended mother had
planned to both ensure the birth of the child and then raise the child as
her own.90  Further, the court held that gestational surrogacy agreements
were not contrary to public policy and found no constitutional rights at
issue for the surrogate.91
Following up on the court’s progressive attitude toward surrogacy, last
year, California was among the first states to adopt a statute enforcing ges-
tational surrogacy agreements.92  New York now has similar legislation
proposed.93  The California and New York statutes are similar to the ve-
toed New Jersey legislation, as all three presume gestational carrier agree-
ments to be valid while placing regulations on such agreements to protect
all of the parties involved.94  Additionally, the California statute requires
89. See id. at 781 (finding both women presented proper evidence of mother-
child relationship).
90. See id. at 782 (looking to parties’ intentions).
91. See id. at 785–86 (establishing intended parents as legal parents).
92. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2014) (validating and regulating surro-
gacy agreements).  The new California law validates gestational surrogacy agree-
ments as long as the parties to a surrogacy agreement have separate counsel, have
the agreement notarized, attest to their compliance with the agreement under
penalty of perjury, and file the agreement with the court. See id. (explaining re-
quirements of new law).
In addition, intended parents in California can establish their parental rights
for a child prior to that child’s birth. See id.  The language of the statute provides
“[u]pon petition of any party to a properly executed assisted reproduction agree-
ment for gestational carriers, the court shall issue a judgment or order establishing
a parent-child relationship . . . .  The judgment or order may be issued before or
after the child’s or children’s birth subject to the limitations of Section 7633.” Id.
§ 7962(f)(2).
93. See Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3: In New York, a Push for
Compensated Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/20/fashion/In-New-York-Some-Couples-Push-for-Legalization-of-Compensated-
Surrogacy.html?_r=0 (following New York state senator’s push for bill allowing ges-
tational surrogacy).  Brad Hoylman, a New York state senator, co-sponsored a bill
to make compensated surrogacy legal and the agreements enforceable. See id. (dis-
cussing proposed surrogacy bill).  The senator and his partner used a surrogate in
California to start their own family, but the couple had to travel to California to
find a surrogate because New York’s laws were so harsh. See id. (explaining per-
sonal experiences with surrogacy).  Hartocollis discusses the extreme costs for New
Yorkers of leaving the state to find surrogate mothers. See id. (discussing conse-
quences of harsh surrogacy laws).
94. See Richard Moody, Updating NY’s Surrogacy Laws, LEGISLATIVE GAZETTE
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-Top-Stories-c-2014-03-
03-87021.113122-Updating-NYs-surrogacy-laws.html (expanding on proposed New
York bill regarding surrogacy).  Moody notes that the New York bill “legally defines
several terms such as artificial insemination, assisted reproductive technology and
providers, and collaborative reproduction.” Id.  Furthermore, if passed, the bill
“would also set new rules for determining the parentage of a child born through a
surrogacy agreement. . . . allow[ing] parentage to be determined before birth but
14
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that the parties each retain individual counsel and have the agreement
notarized before embryo implantation occurs.95
III. NEW JERSEY LACKS MATERNAL INSTINCT BY ONLY SUPPORTING
PRESUMPTION OF FATHERHOOD IN T.J.S.
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a ges-
tational surrogacy agreement in 2012, in T.J.S., refusing to validate the
agreement and leaving the intended mother without legal rights to her
child.96  The intended parents argued that New Jersey’s Parentage Act
could be construed to presume parentage of the intended mother.97  The
Supreme Court split on the issue in a per curiam opinion, resulting in the
affirmance of the Appellate Division’s decision, which had declined to en-
force the agreement.  Still, the concurring and dissenting opinions thor-
oughly discussed both sides of the issues raised by the case.98
A. Facts and Procedure
T.J.S. and his wife, A.L.S., wanted to have a child but were unable to
do so naturally.99  T.J.S. and A.L.S. entered into an agreement with A.F.,
an unrelated third party, to serve as a surrogate and carry a child for the
couple.100  Through in vitro fertilization, the egg of an anonymous donor
was fertilized with the husband’s sperm, and the resulting embryo was im-
planted in A.F.101  The agreement stated A.F. would relinquish parental
rights to the child seventy-two hours after the child was born, not prior to
birth.102
not take effect until after birth.” Id.  Moreover, the bill would notably “define who
would be allowed to petition for a judgment of the parentage of the child.” Id.
95. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (regulating gestational surrogacy agreements).
96. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 264 (N.J. 2012) (Hoens, J., concurring) (de-
clining to enforce gestational surrogacy agreement).
97. See id. (declining to enforce surrogacy agreement despite allegations of
gender discrimination).
98. See id. at 263–80 (providing multiple opinions).
99. See id. at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (explaining A.L.S. was unable to
carry pregnancy to term).  New Jersey law presumes a pregnant woman’s husband
to be the biological father of the child she gives birth to. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-
43(a)(1) (West 2013) (listing multiple ways men can be presumed to be child’s
father).  This provision, entitled “Presumptions,” lists over six different ways a man
can be presumed to be a father, but does not address any presumptions regarding
maternity. See id. § 9:17-43(a) (listing presumptions of paternity).
100. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (noting A.F. was unre-
lated to intended parents or egg donor).
101. See id. (explaining use of in vitro fertilization).  The anonymous egg do-
nor had relinquished any and all rights to the eggs. See id. at 270 (Albin, J., dissent-
ing) (stating egg donor “had relinquished her legal rights to the egg[ ]”).
102. See id. at 271 (noting anticipation of seventy-two hour wait period re-
quired by law).  New Jersey law requires a seventy-two hour wait period before a
biological mother can relinquish her rights to a child. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
41(e).  The statute provides that “[a] surrender of a child shall not be valid if taken
prior to the birth of the child who is the subject of the surrender.  A surrender by
15
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In anticipation of A.F. relinquishing parental rights, A.L.S. and T.J.S.,
the “intended parents,” sought a pre-birth order from the New Jersey Su-
perior Court (Chancery Division), stating that their names should be listed
on the child’s birth certificate as the child’s legal parents upon A.F.’s re-
nouncement of her parental rights.103  The pre-birth order was granted
on July 2, 2009, and the child was born on July 7, 2009.104  As anticipated,
A.F. relinquished all parental rights seventy-two hours after the baby’s
birth, and a birth certificate was issued listing the intended parents, T.J.S.
and A.L.S., as the parents of the newborn.105  Even though A.F. never
tried to assert parental rights, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Bureau of Vital Statistics filed a motion for the court to vacate the
pre-birth order, which would remove A.L.S. from being listed as the
child’s mother.106  The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate
Division ultimately affirmed that judgment.107
On appeal, the couple argued that New Jersey’s Parentage Act vio-
lated the state constitution through gender-based discrimination.108  The
couple asserted that the provisions of the New Jersey Parentage Act
presuming husbands to be the fathers of children to whom their wives give
birth should be read to construe a presumption of maternity for infertile
wives as well.109  The couple claimed that the lack of a presumption of
the birth parent of a child shall not be valid if taken within 72 hours of the birth of
the child.” Id.
103. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 271 (Albin, J., dissenting) (seeking pre-birth order
by filing complaint in Chancery Division, Family Part in Camden County, request-
ing intended parents to be listed on birth certificate).
104. See id. (noting that Superior Court granted order that intended parents
be listed as biological parents on child’s birth certificate).
105. See id. (listing A.L.S. and T.J.S. as parents of child).  The surrogate relin-
quished her rights as agreed and never attempted to assert parental rights over the
child. See id. (stating that surrogate gave up her parental rights to child).
106. See id. (stating Department had not received notice of pre-birth order).
Further, a worker in the hospital had never seen a gestational surrogacy situation
before and called the Bureau of Vital Statistics to make the office aware of the
arrangement. See Kate Zernike, Court’s Split Decision Provides Little Clarity on Surro-
gacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/nyregion/
in-surrogacy-case-nj-supreme-court-is-deadlocked-over-whom-to-call-mom.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining how Department became aware of surrogacy
agreement).
107. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring).
The trial court, after considering the arguments raised on behalf of the
plaintiffs and the Department, granted the Department’s application and
vacated the order that had been entered prior to the child’s birth.  The
Appellate Division affirmed that judgment, rejecting both the statutory
and constitutional arguments that plaintiffs advanced on appeal.
Id.
108. See In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 389–90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (dis-
cussing arguments raised on appeal).
109. See id. (arguing Parentage Act is discriminatory based on gender). See
generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 2013) (presuming husbands of women
who have been artificially inseminated with donor’s sperm to be fathers of children
conceived through artificial insemination).  The statute provides that:
16
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maternity equal to the presumption of paternity constituted an equal pro-
tection violation because it treated similarly-situated infertile married men
and infertile married women differently, without justification.110  Apply-
ing New Jersey’s “substantial relationship” test for equal protection claims,
the Appellate Division found no fundamental right at stake and then re-
jected the equal protection claims, finding that the differences in the law
were based upon “actual reproductive and biological differences.”111  Fur-
ther, the Legislature had created the presumption of paternity for circum-
stances where a man is “highly likely to be the biological father of a child,”
which the Appellate Division found irrelevant to infertile women because
the women would not be biologically linked to the child.112
These decisions had the effect of removing the intended mother,
A.L.S., from the birth certificate, so she had no legal rights over the child
until she could go through the lengthy and costly adoption process, as a
stepparent to the child that was genetically related to her husband.113  In
light of the appellate court’s decision, T.J.S. and A.L.S. appealed to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey.114
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived.  The husband’s consent shall
be in writing and signed by him and his wife.
Id.; see also id. § 9:17-41(a) (defining mother and child relationship based only on
who gave birth to child); id. § 9:17-43(a)(1) (listing all ways man can be presumed
to be child’s father).
110. See T.J.S., 16 A.3d at 390 (explaining equal protection claims).
111. See id. at 398 (rejecting equal protection claims).  The Appellate Division
stated the “‘right to equal protection does not require us to scrutinize gender dis-
tinctions that are based on real physiological differences to the same extent we
would scrutinize those distinctions when they are based on archaic, invidious ste-
reotypes about men and women.’” Id. at 393 (quoting State v. Chun, 943 A.2d
114, 143 (N.J. 2008)).
112. See id. at 393 (discussing purpose of statute).  The court stated the pur-
pose of the presumption of paternity was to ensure children received financial
support from their biological fathers. See id. (explaining Legislature’s intent).  The
Legislature focused on the biological connection, which the court argued did not
apply in situations with no maternal biological connection. See id. (finding written
agreements not enough to establish maternity).
113. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 269 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that court’s decision would require intended mother to go through adop-
tion process even though agreement was never disputed by any relevant parties).
The appellate opinion did not see the adoption process as costly or unnecessary
for the plaintiffs. See T.J.S., 16 A.3d at 398 (discussing effects of adoption process
on plaintiffs).  The Appellate Division found this to be an “acceptable means of
establishing parenthood” and implied that the plaintiffs were just looking for a
more convenient method. See id. (finding adoption to be adequate method of
obtaining parental rights).
114. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 263 (per curiam) (seeking certification to Supreme
Court of New Jersey).
17
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B. New Jersey Supreme Court Delivers Multiple Opinions
The New Jersey Supreme Court heard the case and issued its decision
on October 24, 2012.115  The court reviewed the constitutionality of the
Parentage Act in light of the equal protection issues raised by T.J.S. and
A.L.S.116  The initial per curiam opinion provides no guidance on the
matter and simply stated “[t]he judgment of the Appellate Division . . . is
affirmed by an equally divided Court.”117  Both sides of the issue were
thoroughly analyzed in the concurring and dissenting opinions.118  The
concurring opinion heavily relied upon the Appellate Division’s decision
finding no equal protection violation and declining to enforce the surro-
gacy agreement.119  The dissent argued that the relevant provisions of the
Parentage Act created an equal protection violation, and would have re-
versed the Appellate Division’s judgment.120
1. The Concurrence Fosters Dated Notions of Parentage
The concurrence supported affirming the Appellate Division’s judg-
ment, which refused to enforce the gestational surrogacy agreement.121
First, the opinion agreed with the Appellate Division’s analysis of the lan-
guage of the Parentage Act.122  The statute provided that a biological or
genetic connection to a child is the only way to become the child’s legal
mother at birth; therefore, the concurrence agreed that a written docu-
ment could not create a legal mother-child relationship.123
Second, the concurring justices rejected the equal protection claims
raised against the Parentage Act.124  The concurrence stated that a pre-
sumption of paternity does not automatically create a presumption of ma-
ternity, and the gender differentiations in the Parentage Act were based
115. See id.
116. See id. at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (reviewing constitutionality of Par-
entage Act).
117. See id. at 263 (per curiam) (affirming Appellate Division judgment
through equally divided Supreme Court).  Because the decision was equally di-
vided, it had the effect of affirming the lower court. See id. (affirming lower court
decision).
118. See id. at 264–80 (providing concurring and dissenting opinion).
119. See id. at 264–69 (Hoens, J., concurring) (upholding appellate court de-
cision).  Justice Hoens wrote the concurring decision and agreed with the reason-
ing provided by the Appellate Division. See id. at 264–65 (agreeing with Appellate
Division’s reasoning).
120. See id. at 269–80 (Albin, J., dissenting) (finding New Jersey Parentage Act
confers unequal rights to infertile men and infertile women).  The dissent focused
on the equal protection issues raised by the Parentage Act through the presump-
tion of parentage for infertile men but not infertile women who choose surrogacy
as a means to procreate. See id.
121. See id. at 264–69 (Hoens, J., concurring).
122. See id. at 264 (supporting maternity determination based upon genetic
connection).
123. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a)) (discussing Parentage Act).
124. See id. at 264–65 (dismissing equal protection challenge).
18
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upon physiological differences between men and women.125  The concur-
rence also noted that intended mothers still had the option to become
legal mothers through the adoption process, and the desire for a faster,
more convenient process did not create a constitutional right to have
one.126  Further, the intended parents argued that infertile men and infer-
tile women were similarly situated and deserved equal protection.127  The
concurrence rejected this argument because the individuals in the infer-
tile couple were not the only parties to the agreement; the concurrence
alternatively stressed the significance of the agreement requiring a third
party, the surrogate mother, who also had rights.128  The intended mother
had no fundamental or statutory parental right, but as the birth mother,
the surrogate mother had a constitutional and statutory parental right.129
The concurrence would not recognize a parental right for the intended
mother due to the conflict with the birth mother’s established rights.130
Last, the concurrence found that the legislative or executive branches
would be better suited to confront the concerns raised by the intended
parents.131  The legislature would be better suited to make decisions re-
garding parentage because the legislature has the flexibility and time to
pursue a deeper inquiry into the issue.132  The concurrence stated that
surrogacy was a social policy issue requiring an informed debate and con-
sideration of all parties involved, which is not a constitutional issue but
one for the legislature or executive.133
2. Is It a Boy or a Girl?  The Dissent Asserts Gender Discrimination
The dissenting justices alternatively found that the Parentage Act
treated “similarly situated infertile married women and infertile married
men” differently, thereby violating the state’s equal protection guaran-
tee.134  First, the dissent criticized the Appellate Division’s focus on hypo-
125. See id. at 264 (finding differences in statutes based upon physiological
gender differences).
126. See id. at 264–65 (supporting Appellate Division’s observation of process
already in place for intended mother).
127. See id. at 266 (explaining intended parents’ arguments).
128. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs’ characterization as infertile people).  Justice
Hoens stressed the importance of a third person in surrogacy agreements to com-
bat claims that husbands and wives were being treated unequally. See id. (stating
child is still biologically connected to surrogate mother).
129. See id. (protecting rights of birth mother).
130. See id. (supporting birth mother’s rights over intended mother’s rights).
131. See id. at 267 (finding surrogacy would be better dealt with by executive
or legislative branch).
132. See id. at 268 (discussing consequences of having court decide issue
rather than Legislature).
133. See id. (stating issue requires consideration of all parties, including in-
tended parents and surrogates, and is not court’s role to determine).
134. See id. at 269 (Albin, J., dissenting) (stating case is about unequal treat-
ment of men and women).
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thetical scenarios.135  The Appellate Division found the “‘surrogate
mother whose parental rights are deemed worthy of protection . . . stand
in the way of the infertile wife’s claim to automatic motherhood,’” but the
dissent stressed the difference between such a hypothetical scenario and
the case at hand, where the surrogate mother was cooperative and sup-
portive of the intended parents.136  Thus, the Appellate Division’s conclu-
sion was based upon a fictional scenario, not the facts of the case at
hand.137
Second, the dissent claimed that the concurrence’s analysis of the
Parentage Act did not comport with the purpose of the statute.138  Accord-
ing to the dissent, the purpose of the Parentage Act was to ensure children
receive the financial support due to them from their parents.139  The con-
currence’s interpretation of the statute would, however, in a practical
sense, leave a child born through a surrogacy agreement without a legal
mother during the time it takes to complete the adoption process.140
Third, the dissent analyzed the statute under the state’s “substantial
relationship” equal protection test and reached a conclusion contrary to
the Appellate Division’s decision.141  The state’s balancing test weighs
“(1) the nature of the right at stake, (2) the extent to which the chal-
lenged [law] restricts that right, and (3) the public need for the statutory
restriction.”142  The dissent recognized there was no fundamental right at
issue, but the right for infertile wives to be legal parents, in the same way
infertile husbands would, was substantial.143  Moving to the second prong
of the test, the right was significantly restricted by forcing the intended
135. See id. at 272 (disagreeing with concurrence’s reliance on Appellate Divi-
sion’s hypothetical situation).
136. See id. at 272–73 (alteration in original) (quoting In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386,
396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)) (noting that surrogate did not try to assert
rights to child, so court should limit focus of case to relevant facts).
137. See id. at 273 (finding concurrence’s reliance on hypothetical situations
unconvincing).
138. See id. (discussing purpose of Parentage Act).
139. See id. (stating Parentage Act “guarantees that children will receive the
financial support that is rightfully due from their parents”).
140. See id. (finding result contrary to intended purpose of statute).  The dis-
sent explained that the purpose of the act is to ensure children are always finan-
cially cared for, not to allow the law to leave a child without two legal parents when
they are available. See id. (describing decision as contrary to Parentage Act).  “In-
deed, denying the infertile wife the opportunity to assert a parental right, after the
surrogate surrenders her parental interests, leads to a result completely contrary to
the purpose of the Parentage Act—a child without a legal mother responsible for
the child’s financial support.” Id. at 277.
141. See id. at 276 (applying New Jersey’s “substantial relationship” test).
142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 212
(N.J. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining balancing test).
143. See id. (recognizing no fundamental right at issue).  “The right at issue is
that of an infertile married woman to ‘equality of treatment relative to compara-
ble’ infertile married men.” See id. (quoting Lewis, 908 A.2d at 215).
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mother to go through the costly and time-consuming adoption process.144
The dissent then found no necessity or “legitimate public need” to create
this disadvantage for intended mothers because New Jersey did not pro-
hibit surrogacy agreements, and the parties entered into the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily.145  Applying the balancing test, the dissent con-
cluded that the Parentage Act violated the state’s equal protection guaran-
tees by discriminating against infertile women.146
Last, the dissent distinguished the case of T.J.S. from the infamous
case of Baby M.147  The concurring opinion and the Appellate Division
decision used Baby M to support the affirmance of the trial court’s hold-
ing, but the dissent found that the facts at hand created very different
circumstances from those in Baby M.148  The surrogacy agreement in Baby
M was declared void because it was against public policy; however, the de-
cision in Baby M did not declare all surrogacy agreements void.149  The
Baby M court held that a surrogate’s parental rights could not be relin-
quished by contract or prior to birth.150  The agreement in T.J.S. recog-
nized A.F.’s ability to assert parental rights upon the birth of the child, but
she did not do so.151  Additionally, the contract in Baby M was void based
upon public policy concerns, due to the compensation the surrogate re-
ceived, but there was no evidence of compensation beyond costs relating
to childbirth in T.J.S.152  Therefore, the Baby M decision was distinguisha-
ble from T.J.S.153
144. See id. (stating adoption can take two to three months).  During this pe-
riod, if the intended mother passed away, the child would be unable to benefit
from worker’s compensation or Social Security benefits, and it would be unable to
inherit from the mother if she would die intestate. See id. (discussing repercus-
sions of refusing to recognize intended mother as legal mother of child).
145. See id. at 277 (commenting that law disfavoring intended mothers actu-
ally acts in contrast to purpose of Parentage Act).  The dissent asserted that the
purpose of the Parentage Act was to ensure children had parents who were legally
and financially responsible for the child, not to remove a potential legal parent.
See id. (discussing purpose of Parentage Act).
146. See id. at 278 (finding gender discrimination).  “The disparate treatment
of infertile wives based solely on their sex is not justified by any substantial govern-
ment interest and is an arbitrary denial of A.L.S.’s right to equal protection of the
laws.” Id.
147. See id. (distinguishing facts of T.J.S. from facts of Baby M).
148. See id.
149. See id. (explaining Baby M holding).  Only compensated surrogacy agree-
ments are against New Jersey public policy; the New Jersey courts never found any
fault with uncompensated agreements, and surrogacy agreements are not illegal in
the state. See id. (summarizing New Jersey surrogacy law).
150. See id. (discussing holding of Baby M).
151. See id. (describing facts of T.J.S.).
152. See id. at 278–79 (stating record only suggests compensation for costs
related to pregnancy and birth of child).
153. See id. at 269–80 (finding presumption of paternity present under Artifi-
cial Insemination statute, but lack of presumption of maternity under Parentage
Act, creating inequality of law).
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IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: T.J.S. ILLUSTRATES THE OUTCRY FOR THE
ADOPTION OF LEGISLATION TO PROTECT PARTIES TO
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
By failing to enforce gestational surrogacy agreements, the New Jersey
Supreme Court halted the progress of infertility technology and limited
New Jersey residents’ options for how to become parents.154  New Jersey
courts have consistently refused to enforce surrogacy agreements.155  New
Jersey courts could have followed California’s lead after Johnson and up-
held surrogacy agreements by distinguishing gestational surrogacy cases
from Baby M.156  Alternatively, the evenly divided T.J.S. court also could
have found that New Jersey’s Parentage Act violated the state’s equal pro-
tection guarantee with just one more vote; nevertheless, the equally split
court upheld the lower courts’ decisions and continued New Jersey’s tradi-
tion of declining to enforce surrogacy agreements.157  The courts continu-
ously invalidate surrogacy agreements because the agreements are
contradictory to the New Jersey Parentage Act and the state’s public pol-
icy.158  Because of the courts’ anti-enforcement stance on surrogacy agree-
ments, the only effective option to protect parties to surrogacy agreements
is through legislation, which the courts have frequently suggested as a
remedy.159  Moreover, legislation would create guidelines to ease the pub-
lic policy concerns associated with surrogacy and provide protection to the
parties involved.160
154. See id. at 263 (per curiam) (failing to enforce surrogacy contract).
155. See, e.g., id. (refusing to recognize intended mother as legal mother and
removing intended mother from birth certificate); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227,
1264 (N.J. 1988) (declining to enforce surrogacy agreement resulting in surrogate
mother being deemed legal mother); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009
N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *1–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009)
(refusing to enter pre-birth order in relation to surrogacy agreement); A.H.W. v.
G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (granting maternal rights
to surrogate mother for same-sex couple).
156. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (uphold-
ing gestational surrogacy agreement).
157. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a) (West 2013) (defining mother and child
relationship based only on who gave birth to child); see also id. § 9:17-44 (presum-
ing husbands of women who have been artificially inseminated with donor sperm
to be father of child); T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 263 (per curiam) (upholding lower courts’
decisions not to enforce surrogacy agreement).
158. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 263 (per curiam) (finding surrogacy agreements
contradictory to New Jersey Parentage Act); see also Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246 (dis-
cussing numerous public policy concerns with surrogacy agreements that were
much more uncommon in past).
159. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 263 (per curiam) (refusing to enforce surrogacy
agreement); see also Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist
Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488, 515 (1995) (supporting legislation as necessary re-
form to protect parties in surrogacy agreements).  Brandel argues for legislation to
protect the parties to these agreements due to the states’ highly inconsistent
“patchwork of judicial precedent and legislative activity.” See id.
160. See, e.g., S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (enforcing gestational surrogacy
agreements and providing regulation for surrogacy agreements).
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A. Legislation Would Soothe Surrogacy’s Contradictions with the Parentage Act
The New Jersey Supreme Court missed its opportunity to bring New
Jersey’s surrogacy law up to date, but the courts frequently suggest that it is
the Legislature that should take up the issue.161  The concurrence in T.J.S.
put a strong emphasis on why the Legislature would be more suited to
handle the issue; and the courts in A.G.R. and A.H.W. also mentioned
possible legislative intervention.162  Thus, while the courts have not found
it appropriate to enforce these agreements, the Legislature should change
the law to enforce them.163
Legislation would resolve surrogacy agreements’ contradiction with
the requirements of the Parentage Act.164  The proposed New Jersey bill,
for example, would have amended the relevant parts of the New Jersey
Parentage Act to properly allow for intended parents to be the legal par-
161. See, e.g., T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 266 (Hoens, J., concurring) (noting that Legis-
lature would be better suited to handle issues surrounding surrogacy); Baby M, 537
A.2d at 1235 (stating its holding did not preclude Legislature from creating legisla-
tion to allow surrogacy); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (noting Legisla-
ture could have allowed surrogacy by statute but had not yet done so); A.H.W. v.
G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (stating Legislature could
weigh in on gestational surrogacy contracts, but courts must follow current law as
closely as possible prior to legislative action).  In each of these cases, the courts
found that applicable statutory authority and case law precluded enforcement of
compensated surrogacy agreements but acknowledged the ability of the legislative
branch to change the statutory constraints on these agreements. See, e.g., T.J.S., 54
A.3d at 266 (Hoens, J., concurring) (discussing potential legislative action).
162. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 266 (Hoens, J., concurring) (finding Legislature
better suited to consider issues surrounding surrogacy); A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *8 (suggesting Legislature could ascertain rights of parties
to surrogacy agreements); A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954.  The concurrence in T.J.S.
stated that the Legislature is “ordinarily the body vested with making decisions
about such important social policies as this.” See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 267 (Hoens, J.,
concurring).  Additionally, the court in A.H.W. seemed to support legislative inter-
vention that would create relief for the intended parents. See A.H.W., 772 A.2d at
954 (discussing possible ways to provide relief for parties involved).  The A.H.W.
court found that absent legislative action to decipher the rights of the involved
parties, “[t]he most prudent course . . . is to follow the current statutes as closely as
possible while allowing the parties, to the maximum extent possible, the relief re-
quested.” See id.
163. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 266 (Hoens, J., concurring) (finding other branches
of government better suited to confront surrogacy); Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235 (not-
ing Legislature could create statutes to allow for surrogacy agreements within con-
stitutional limits); A.G.R., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *8 (recognizing
that Legislature had not yet acted on issue of surrogacy); A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954
(suggesting Legislature address issues surrounding surrogacy agreements).
164. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a) (West 2013) (establishing maternal
rights for woman who gives birth to child).  Surrogacy agreements currently con-
tradict this law by attempting to recognize a woman who has not given birth to the
child as the legal mother. See T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring) (af-
firming lower courts’ findings and holding that agreement making intended
mother also legal mother contradicts New Jersey Parentage Act).
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ents of a child “immediately upon the birth of the child . . . .”165  The
statutory concerns would no longer be a barrier to intended parents.166
The statute would allow for both the intended father and the intended
mother to be legal parents at birth, so the equal protection issues dis-
cussed by the dissent in T.J.S. would become moot.167
Legislation would also ease the statutory concerns set forth by the Ap-
pellate Division.168  The T.J.S. concurrence favored the rights of the birth
mother (the surrogate mother) over the intended mother because the
Legislature had afforded the birth mother the presumption of maternity,
while choosing not to grant intended mothers this right in any circum-
stances.169  A model surrogacy statute would enforce agreements so an
intended mother could be the legal parent at birth and would remove the
72-hour wait period required according to the adoption statute.170
B. Legislation Is Necessary to Calm Public Policy Concerns
Proper legislation would provide safeguards for all of the parties in-
volved in surrogacy agreements.171  Legislation should create require-
ments for both surrogate mothers and intended parents, in order for an
165. See S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (making intended parents of valid
gestational surrogacy agreement legal parents upon child’s birth).
166. See id. (allowing intended parents to become legal parents of child “im-
mediately upon the birth of the child”). Contra N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (requir-
ing seventy-two hour waiting period before birth mother can relinquish parental
rights to child).
167. See N.J. S. 1599 (introduced Feb. 13, 2012; passed by Senate as amended
May 31, 2012); A. 2636, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (introduced Mar. 8, 2012; amended
June 21, 2012). Contra N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (requiring seventy-two hour wait
period before terminating parental rights); id. § 9:17-41(a) (providing legal mater-
nal rights to birth mother but not intended mother).
168. See In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (estab-
lishing that statutory definition of parent and child relationship only extends to
relationship between natural or adoptive parents and only defines natural mother
as birth mother).
169. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(a) (failing to create mother-child relation-
ship through any means other than giving birth to child); see also T.J.S., 54 A.3d at
266 (Hoens, J., concurring) (stating birth mother has statutory and constitutional
right to legal parent-child relationship and recognizing no constitutional or statu-
tory right protecting intended parents in surrogacy agreements).  The T.J.S. con-
currence did not believe that refusing to terminate the surrogate’s parental rights
interfered with the intended mother’s right because she could still adopt the child.
See id. (recognizing rights of birth mothers).  However, the dissent pointed out the
numerous problems that the lengthy adoption process poses for the intended par-
ents, including lack of protection or benefits should the mother die before the
process concludes, as well as the costs and time constraints associated with adop-
tion. See id. at 276–77 (Albin, J., dissenting) (discussing negative aspects of adop-
tion process as opposed to enforcement of surrogacy agreements).
170. See, e.g., N.J. S. 1599 (creating legal parent-child relationship upon birth
of child and removing seventy-two hour wait period before birth mother can relin-
quish rights).
171. See Brandel, supra note 159, at 489 (asserting well-planned legislation
could protect all parties involved in surrogacy agreements).
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agreement to be valid.172  These requirements would ensure the welfare of
the child during pregnancy and establish that the intended parents are fit
to raise a child.173  The statute would also provide protection for the child
by requiring the intended parents to remain legally responsible for the
child, even should the intended parents breach the surrogacy agreement
before the child is born.174  This provision ensures that the child is cared
for financially, even if the intended parents attempt to renege on the
agreement for any reason.175
Ideal legislation would only extend enforcement to gestational surro-
gacy contracts.176  Limiting the scope of legislation to regulating gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements reflects courts’ concerns regarding
traditional surrogacy contracts and would suggest that traditional surro-
gacy agreements should be avoided, because the legislation will not en-
force them.177  Limiting enforcement to gestational surrogacy agreements
alleviates the concerns initially set forth in Baby M, that enforcing tradi-
tional surrogacy agreements would separate children from their genetic
mothers.178  A traditional surrogate mother who is genetically related to
the child has a much more compelling argument for parental rights, as
172. See, e.g., N.J. S. 1599 (establishing requirements for parties entering into
surrogacy agreements).  The act required a surrogate be at least twenty-one-years
old, have already given birth to at least one healthy child, complete psychological
and medical evaluations, and retain counsel independent from the intended par-
ents. See id. (requiring provisions be met before any woman can be eligible as
surrogate).  The act also required intended parents to complete a psychological
evaluation and retain counsel independent from the surrogate. See id. (requiring
provisions be met by intended parents for surrogacy agreement to be valid).
173. See id. (demonstrating that child will be protected during pregnancy by
ensuring surrogate’s proper medical evaluations and prior pregnancies).  The
child would further be protected by the creation of a legal relationship between
the intended parents and the child upon birth, so the child is taken care of finan-
cially. See id.
174. See id. (creating legal responsibility of intended parents immediately
upon child’s birth).  “The breach of the gestational carrier agreement by the in-
tended parent shall not relieve the intended parent of the support obligations
imposed by the parent and child relationship . . . .” Id.  Additionally, the act pro-
vided the basis for a child support action against an intended parent. See id.  Such
a provision would clarify potential problems similar to those of Sherri Shepherd, as
discussed above. See Ramisetti, supra note 5.
175. See N.J. S. 1599 (creating legal and financial responsibility for intended
parents immediately upon child’s birth).
176. See id. (declaring gestational carrier agreements in accordance with pub-
lic policy in New Jersey).
177. See id. (limiting enforcement to agreements involving “gestational car-
rier” who acts as surrogate “without the use of her own egg”).
178. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246 (N.J. 1988) (refusing to terminate
rights of surrogate who was also child’s genetic mother).
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opposed to a gestational surrogate.179  Both the proposed New Jersey act
and the current California statute only enforce gestational agreements.180
Proper legislation would also limit the costs associated with surro-
gacy.181  Another common criticism of surrogacy agreements comes from
comparisons to “baby-selling,” due to the compensation of surrogate
mothers.182  Intended parents usually compensate surrogates in return for
the surrogate’s services and pay for medical and other expenses through-
out the pregnancy as well.183  Legislation should limit the compensation a
surrogate would receive.184  The proposed New Jersey law limited com-
pensation to “reasonable expenses,” which included medical expenses re-
lated to the pregnancy or birth of the child, expenses for counseling
services, legal fees in regards to the surrogacy agreement, and reasonable
living expenses.185  These expenses can add up quickly, but limiting the
costs payable to necessities and expenses related to the pregnancy pre-
vents couples from paying outrageous costs to use a surrogate.186
179. See Difonzo & Stern, supra note 2, at 393 (discussing ways courts have
distinguished traditional surrogacy from gestational surrogacy).
180. See N.J. S. 1599 (enforcing only gestational surrogacy agreements); see
also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2014).
181. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (limiting costs paid to surrogate mothers).
182. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1241 (comparing surrogacy to “baby-bartering”
and explaining evils associated with it).  The Baby M court worried about baby-
selling and found “[t]he negative consequences of baby-buying are potentially pre-
sent in the surrogacy context, especially the potential for placing and adopting a
child without regard to the interest of the child or the natural mother.” Id. at
1242.
183. See Brock A. Patton, Note, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of
Federal Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 513
(2010) (stating that intended parents enter into agreements to achieve reproduc-
tion goals while surrogates enter into same agreements for many different motiva-
tions, including associated fees).  Patton enumerates different reasons that women
agree to be surrogates, including connecting their employment to their domestic
lives, simple goodwill in helping another couple, and also compensation. See id.
(discussing motivation for women to become surrogate mothers).  While the fees
probably still play a large role in the decision, Patton suggests that many women do
not name compensation as their motivation for entering into a surrogacy agree-
ment. See id. (explaining motivational factors).
184. See N.J. S. 1599 (defining reasonable expenses).  Reasonable expenses
include:
[M]edical, hospital, counseling or other similar expenses incurred in
connection with the gestational carrier agreement, reasonable attorney
fees and costs for legal services in connection with the gestational carrier
agreement, and the reasonable living expenses of the gestational carrier
during her pregnancy including payments for reasonable food, clothing,
medical expenses, shelter, and religious, psychological, vocational, or
similar counseling services during the period of the pregnancy and dur-
ing the period of postpartum recovery.
Id.
185. See id. (limiting expenses and costs surrogate mothers can receive as
compensation in order for agreement to be enforced).
186. See id. (defining “reasonable expenses”).
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Limiting the expenses also helps to combat the concerns about ex-
ploitation of the women serving as surrogates.187  The Baby M court ex-
pressed concern about degrading women and creating a class distinction
between infertile couples and surrogates.188  However, as one commenter
noted, surrogacy has the potential “both to exploit and to liberate wo-
men.”189  While the exploitation of women is a very legitimate concern,
with proper regulation, surrogacy can be a key option for women who
would otherwise be unable to have children or begin a family.190  By limit-
ing the expenses surrogates can receive to reasonable wages and providing
strict requirements as to who can serve as a surrogate, surrogacy is less
likely to become an exploitative necessity for vulnerable women.191  Put-
ting requirements and limitations on surrogacy will weed out many women
who should not be surrogates and would enter into an agreement for the
wrong reasons.192  Limitations created through legislation would help to
ensure a mutually beneficial relationship for the intended parents and the
surrogate mother and work to protect all of the parties to the
agreement.193
187. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 67 (noting that allowing regulation of com-
pensation for surrogacy would aid in combatting exploitation of surrogate
mothers).
188. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (expressing con-
cern with taking advantage of women’s circumstances).  While the court recog-
nized that “the Sterns [were] not rich and the Whiteheads not poor,” the court still
worried about the potential class distinction created by the compulsion of a large
fee for surrogacy. See id. at 1249 (discussing economic status of the parties).  The
court also asserted that “in a civilized society, [there are] some things that money
cannot buy.” See id.
189. Brandel, supra note 159, at 489 (discussing potential harms of surrogacy
agreements and possible solutions for such issues).  Brandel asserts that “although
critics have valid concerns about surrogacy and its implications, carefully drafted
legislation can minimize the potentially exploitative aspects of surrogacy and pro-
tect the individuals who choose it as a reproductive option.” See id.
190. See id. at 516–19 (expressing concern over lack of regulation due to in-
creased possibility for exploitation of women without restrictions).  Brandel points
out that without the proper medical and psychological examinations required by
most gestational surrogacy statutes, the risk of exploiting vulnerable women re-
mains significantly higher. See id. at 518–19 (stating need for regulation of surro-
gacy agreements).
191. See id. at 516–19 (discussing potential for exploiting women and statu-
tory solutions to this risk); see also Abigail Lauren Perdue, For Love or Money: An
Analysis of the Contractual Regulation of Reproductive Surrogacy, 27 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 290–91 (2010) (arguing surrogacy does not risk exploita-
tion any more than “exotic dancing, posing for pornographic magazines, donating
gametes, or serving as a telephone sex operator” does).
192. See S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (regulating what women can serve as
surrogates under legally enforceable gestational surrogacy agreements).
193. See Difonzo & Stern, supra note 2, at 349–75 (discussing mutual benefits
of surrogacy agreements).  While surrogates tend to have lower incomes than the
intended parents, there is no evidence that these women are typically in any eco-
nomic crisis. See id. (discussing economic status of parties to surrogacy agree-
ments).  Compensation from gestational surrogacy agreements frequently serves to
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V. CONCLUSION
Whether or not legislation enforcing gestational surrogacy agree-
ments passes, New Jersey residents will continue to seek surrogate mothers
as a way to start their families.194  For many individuals and couples, gesta-
tional surrogates provide the only option to have a genetic connection to a
child.195  Surrogacy agreements are not prohibited or illegal in New
Jersey, and many fertility clinics continue to advertise for surrogates in
New Jersey.196  Surrogacy agreements undoubtedly have and will continue
to be utilized in New Jersey.197  If New Jersey does not see fit to ban surro-
gacy, the state must pass legislation to regulate the practice.198  As the
practice of surrogacy continues to grow, New Jersey needs to provide gui-
dance and protection for all of the parties involved, including the child,
the intended parents, and the surrogate mother.199  Therefore, New
Jersey needs legislation to regulate the practice of gestational surrogacy
agreements within the state and protect intended parents like A.L.R.200
“supplement” a surrogate’s income or to allow her to stay home, as surrogates
usually have families of their own. See id. at 357–58.
194. See Susan K. Livio, Christie Vetoes Bill that Would Have Eased Tough Rules for
Gestational Surrogates, STAR-LEDGER (Aug. 8, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.nj.com/
politics/index.ssf/2012/08/christie_vetoes_bill_that_woul.html (noting surrogacy
continued to occur in New Jersey for decades, even after court’s decision in Baby M
case).  The attorney for the intended parents in T.J.S., Donald C. Cofsky, stated
that “[g]estational carrier arrangements have been taking place in New Jersey for
well over a decade, and are, and will remain, legal.” Id.
195. See Silberberg, supra note 3 (explaining how surrogacy allows infertile
couples to have children who are still “truly [their] own”).
196. See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 279 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining surrogacy agreements may be declared void but are not illegal).  The dis-
sent explained “[s]urrogacy agreements—such as the one in this case—are not
uncommon in this State; no party has claimed otherwise or that they are illegal.”
Id. at 278–79.
197. See Livio, supra note 194 (stating use of gestational carriers has increased
28% since 2007, according to American Society of Reproductive Medicine).
198. See id. (expressing concern that, due to lack of regulation, children born
through surrogates could be left without legal parents).  Because surrogacy is not
illegal in New Jersey, these agreements will continue to happen. See id.  However,
without regulation, none of the parties involved receive any legal protection. See
id. (discussing concerns due to vetoing of New Jersey bill).
199. See Brandel, supra note 159, at 515 (supporting legislation as necessary
reform to protect parties in surrogacy agreements).  Brandel asserts that proper
legislation is necessary not only to protect the parties involved, but also to make
surrogacy more predictable. See id. (discussing necessity of legislation on gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements).
200. See, e.g., S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (setting requirements for surro-
gates, intended parents, and providing for child should disagreements arise re-
garding surrogacy agreement).
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